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Individual behaviors that benefit the envi-
ronment are potentially influenced by personal 
values of environmental quality, social norms 
that encourage proenvironmental actions, and 
economic incentives. Economic incentives often 
loom particularly large, including those that 
result from environmental policies. Less well 
understood are the respective roles of private 
values and social norms. Do people undertake 
proenvironmental actions more out of their per-
sonal valuations of the environment that might 
be characterized as warm glow effects or from 
the social norms that reinforce proenvironmen-
tal behaviors?
The least explored component of these deter-
minants of proenvironmental behavior is that of 
social norms. We characterize social norms in 
terms of what is normatively appropriate rather 
than what is the conventional mode of behav-
ior. There is a burgeoning economics literature 
modeling social norms, but not a commensurate 
empirical investigation of their practical impor-
tance. If norms do matter, what is the respective 
role of personal norms that a person imposes on 
others compared with the external norms that 
people perceive are imposed on them by others? 
To what extent are these social norms the result 
of legal regimes and regulatory policies that 
establish standards for behavior? Our empirical 
analysis estimates the role of these influences.
The empirical case study for this article is 
based on an analysis of recycling of plastic 
water bottles. Recycling policies are becoming 
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increasingly prominent generally (see Thomas 
C. Kinnaman 2006), and plastic water bottle 
recycling is at the forefront of many recycling 
policy initiatives. Plastic water bottle recycling 
is of tremendous practical importance, as US 
sales of bottled water have grown rapidly, from 
around 20 billion bottles in 1997, to 36 billion 
in 2006, reaching 50 billion in 2008. This com-
prises nearly half of all polyethylene terephthal-
ate bottles, and in 2006 accounted for more than 
2 million tons of incinerated or landfill waste. 
Five states (California, Connecticut, Hawaii, 
Maine, and Oregon) have enacted bottle deposit 
laws for plastic water bottles, and such deposit 
legislation has been proposed or is pending in 
other states.
Economic incentives enter the consumer’s 
recycling decision through the financial rewards 
for the return of their bottles for deposit and 
through laws and policies that alter the mone-
tary and convenience costs of recycling. Factors 
unrelated to time and money costs also are pres-
ent, as people may choose to recycle because of 
personal attitudes or because of their perception 
of social norms toward recycling. To capture the 
influence of personal values, we use data on per-
sonal attitudes toward the environment. Our data 
include unique empirical measures regarding 
the degree to which one values socially accept-
able behavior in others compared with whether 
one believes others value that behavior. We will 
show that the private values reflected in becom-
ing upset at neighbors not recycling are far more 
predictive of a person’s behavior than the exter-
nal norms reflected in their beliefs about what 
their neighbors might think of them.
We model the disposal mode for waste as a 
binary choice. Consider a decision between 
returning a bottle for deposit or disposing of 
it in the garbage. Once a person has chosen a 
disposal mode for that bottle, it will usually be 
desirable to continue to use that mode for addi-
tional bottles, producing a corner solution in 
terms of the recycling decision. We begin here 
with a simple theoretical model for returning 
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bottles for deposit versus disposing of them in 
the garbage. The conceptual structure is similar 
for other forms of recycling such as curbside, 
but those modes do not include a financial pay-
off for bottle returns.
Let each disposal mode have an associated 
fixed cost as well as a unit disposal or return 
cost per bottle. The cost of returning bottles for 
deposit is ( t d0 +  t d1 n) w, where td0 is the fixed 
time cost, td1 is the unit time cost per bottle, n 
is the number of bottles returned, and w is the 
opportunity cost of time given by the wage 
rate. Similarly, disposing of bottles in the gar-
bage has an analogously defined time cost of 
( t g0 +  t g1 n) w. Returning bottles for deposit also 
yields a deposit refund payment p per bottle.
The disposal decision also entails nonpecu-
niary components. The overall nonpecuniary 
benefit b that the person derives per bottle that 
is recycled depends on components that reflect 
both private values and social norms. We denote 
the warm glow environmental valuation compo-
nent that recyclers receive by e, as individuals 
may derive utility from taking proenvironmen-
tal actions. Returning bottles for deposit may 
also enable the person to feel virtuous or mor-
ally superior to neighbors, based on personal 
norms, which we denote by v. Failing to recycle 
bottles may produce environmental guilt if they 
believe that they are not behaving in a way that 
is consistent with external norms for accept-
able behavior. Thus, there is a per bottle unit 
green guilt cost c of throwing the bottles away 
in the garbage. There also may be an income 
elasticity associated with environmental ben-
efit valuations, which we expect to be posi-
tive if environmental quality is a normal good. 
The nonpecuniary benefit per bottle returned 
is b(e, v, w), and the external norm guilt cost c 
enters negatively in the disposal decision.
The choice to return bottles for deposit will be 
preferable to garbage disposal if
(1) b(e, v, w)n − ( t d0 +  t d1 n)w + pn
 > − cn − ( t g0 +  t g1 n)w.
If the household already uses both disposal 
modes so that fixed costs can be excluded, the 
bottle return condition becomes
(2) b(e, v, w) + c + p >  t d1 −  t g1 .
The unit value of the private benefits stemming 
from environmental valuations, virtue, and the 
value of the averted guilt, plus the bottle deposit 
amount, must exceed any increase in the unit 
bottle time costs due to returning bottles for 
deposit as compared to disposal in the garbage.
Given the assumed linear structure of the recy-
cling decision, it is straightforward to show, as 
in Viscusi et al. (forthcoming), that if it is desir-
able to recycle n bottles then it will be desirable 
to recycle n + 1 bottles. Thus, one would expect 
the distribution of recycling amounts to be char-
acterized by corner solutions in which people 
tend either not to recycle at all or to be diligent 
recyclers. There should be few households that 
are in the intermediate category of recycling a 
moderate amount. This discontinuous response 
is reflected in the recycling patterns documented 
in Viscusi et al. (forthcoming).
To examine the determinants of recycling 
decisions, we use an original dataset consisting 
of 608 households from our 2009 US survey of 
recycling behavior. The data are from a Web-
based survey administered to the Knowledge 
Networks panel. The particular sample analyzed 
is the subsample of bottled water users from a 
nationally representative sample of households. 
Based on the resident’s state and the time period, 
variables for state recycling and deposit laws 
were matched to each respondent.
The empirical analysis permits assessment of 
the degree to which people gravitate to corner 
solutions as well as the influence of each of the 
components of the decision. In particular, our 
dataset provides information on the number out 
of every ten plastic water bottles that the house-
hold reports recycling. This information is at 
the individual household level, which is more 
refined than in previous studies.
Several variables capture the cost components 
of recycling. We measure the value of time costs, 
w, using the level of household income. Time 
costs also will be influenced by the amount of 
time involved and the convenience of recycling. 
Chief among the potential influences on the time 
cost is the stringency of state recycling law that 
is in place. Ranked in order of stringency are 
the 14 states (plus Washington, DC) that have 
laws requiring mandatory recycling or provide 
an opportunity for recycling, the 15 states that 
require the development of a recycling plan, 
the 6 states that specify a recycling goal but 
otherwise do not impose requirements, and the 
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15 states with no recycling law at all. With more 
stringent laws, the availability of recycling loca-
tions tends to rise, increasing the ease and reduc-
ing the time cost of recycling. These laws in turn 
affect the availability of recycling opportunities, 
as shown by Bell, Huber, and Viscusi (2010).
State deposit laws affect recycling time costs 
and the monetary payoff. If there is a deposit 
law covering plastic water bottles, then there is 
a payment p per bottle returned. However, even 
a deposit law that does not cover water bottles 
might boost recycling rates by leading people to 
visit a recycling center for their other bottles and 
cans, thus lowering the fixed time cost component 
associated with recycling plastic water bottles.
A distinctive aspect of our data is the inclusion 
of detailed information about the nonpecuniary 
aspects of the recycling decision that affect the 
value of b(e, v, w). The warm glow environmen-
tal benefit measure of e is captured by the variable 
for whether the respondent considers himself or 
herself to be an environmentalist. This variable 
is more influential than whether the respondent 
belongs to a national environmental organization, 
although as shown in Viscusi et al. (forthcoming), 
that measure, too, has a positive effect on recy-
cling behavior. Overall, 42 percent of respondents 
describe themselves as being environmentalists.
The social norm attitudes are less prevalent, 
as 68 percent of the sample express neither a pri-
vate value nor the perception of an external norm 
for recycling. The variable we use in the analysis 
to capture the respondent’s private value asso-
ciated with recycling is a 0-1 dummy variable 
for whether the respondent would be upset with 
neighbors if they did not recycle.1 The share 
of respondents indicating such a private norm 
was 28 percent of the sample. The analogous 
measure of the cost of external norm c is a 0-1 
dummy variable for whether the respondent’s 
neighbors would be upset with someone who 
did not recycle.2 Only 16 percent of the  sample 
1 Our characterization of social norms is different from 
that of Bente Halvorsen (2008), who considers a cluster of 
effects relating to norms and attitudes generally. Her vari-
able pertaining to the respondent generally liking “to do 
what I want others to do” is closer to our characterization 
of social norms. 
2 The survey asked respondents their opinions about sev-
eral statements on a five-point scale: strongly disagree, dis-
agree, no opinion, agree, and strongly agree. For whether the 
respondent would be upset, the text was: “I would be upset 
if I noticed someone in my neighborhood putting recyclable 
 acknowledged such an external norm, with 
three-fourths of this group also voicing a private 
value of recycling behavior. Thus, there is little 
evidence of concern with external norms in the 
absence of private values. Higher income levels, 
which is our measure of the opportunity cost w of 
recycling, are expected to have a positive effect 
on b(e, v, w) if there is a positive income elastic-
ity of the demand for environmental quality.
The discontinuous nature of recycling deci-
sions is borne out in the sample distribution 
of the number of bottles out of ten that people 
recycle. The percent of nonrecyclers, those who 
indicated they did not recycle at all, is 6 per-
cent for states with water bottle deposit laws, 
17 percent for states with deposit laws that do 
not cover water bottles, and 35 percent for states 
with no deposit law. By contrast, the intermedi-
ate category of recycling amounts is not sensi-
tive to the recycling regime, which is what we 
predict based on economic theory. The distribu-
tion of respondents in the 1–7 out of 10 bottles 
category is 12 percent for states without deposit 
laws, 13 percent for states with deposit laws that 
do not include plastic water bottles, and 7 per-
cent for states with deposit laws including plas-
tic water bottles. The percentage of respondents 
who recycle 8–10 out of 10 bottles is 53 percent 
for states without deposit laws, 69 percent for 
states with deposit laws that do not include plas-
tic water bottles, and 87 percent for states with 
plastic water bottle deposits. Thus, the presence 
of deposit laws does not increase the percent-
age of recyclers in the intermediate category, but 
rather shifts the mass of the distribution to the 
diligent recycler group.
These results are also true more generally. 
Controlling for state laws and a detailed set of 
individual and regional characteristics, effec-
tive recycling laws and water bottle deposits 
generate a discontinuous shift in behavior, trans-
forming nonrecyclers into diligent recyclers. 
The regression estimates in Table 1 permit the 
analysis of the respective role of private  values, 
social norms, and economic incentives. The 
materials into the garbage.” For whether neighbors would 
be upset, the text was: “Other people in my neighborhood 
would be upset if they noticed someone putting recyclable 
materials into the garbage.” For our analysis, the personal 
and external social norm variables take on a value of one if 
the respondent agreed or strongly agreed with the statement 
and zero otherwise. 
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three columns of estimates report OLS and Tobit 
results for the number recycled out of every 
10 bottles used, and ordered probit results for 
diligent recyclers who recycle 8–10 out of 10 
bottles, intermediate recyclers who recycle 1–7 
out of 10 bottles, and nonrecyclers who recycle 
0 out of 10 bottles. Since the signs and statisti-
cal significance of the variables are similar, we 
focus here on the first column of OLS estimates. 
Private valuation of the environment as reflected 
in whether the respondent is a self-described 
environmentalist boosts recycling by an average 
of 1.2 out of 10 bottles. The social norm vari-
able reflecting one’s potential guilt with respect 
to neighbors’ attitudes if one does not recycle 
is not statistically significant. By contrast, reg-
istering a private value toward recycling boosts 
returns by 2.0 out of 10 bottles. Thus, the inter-
nal private value is critical in promoting recy-
cling, while the external norm is not.
It is important to speculate on why the internal 
value may be so much more important than the 
external one. The importance of the private norm 
is easy to understand. It would be inconsistent 
if not hypocritical to be upset with  neighbors’ 
 failure to recycle if one did not recycle one-
self. By contrast, the external norm has no such 
behavioral link. Particularly in today’s individu-
alistic climate, it is reasonable for a person to 
acknowledge that his or her failure to recycle 
will upset neighbors and still not do it. Ignoring 
a neighbor’s response is particularly reasonable 
if one’s neighbors are unlikely to see the trans-
gression, or if the transgressor gains utility from 
upsetting those neighbors. In any event, our data 
are consistent with the conclusion that substan-
tial changes in recycling are unlikely to derive 
from perceived external pressure. However, the 
various recycling law variables may capture, in 
part, reciprocity effects whereby recycling by 
others influences one’s recycling behavior.
Neither private values nor social norms are 
more influential than the combined effect of 
the variables that capture the role of economic 
incentives. Plastic water bottle deposit laws 
boost recycling amounts by 2.5 out of 10 bot-
tles. States with deposit laws that do not cover 
water bottles also increase recycling, though by 
less than half as much as in states where  plastic 
water bottles are included. The most effective 
Table 1—Regressions Predicting Number of Plastic Water Bottles Recycled
Number of bottles
recycled out of 10 
(OLS)
Number of bottles
recycled out of 10 
(Tobit)
Ordered probit
(8–10, 1–7, 0 bottles 
out of 10)
Neighbors would be upset if someone 0.3977 1.4005 0.2530
 put recyclables in garbage (0.3885) (1.7130) (0.1949)
Respondent would be upset if neighbors 1.9946*** 7.3378*** 0.7766***
 put recyclables in garbage (0.3686) (1.5020) (0.1600)
State has deposit law that does not cover 1.0582** 3.6389** 0.3145*
 water bottles (0.4891) (1.7309) (0.1705)
State has deposit law covering water bottles 2.5100*** 9.3815*** 0.9531***
(0.3526) (1.6626) (0.1794)
State has mandatory recycling or provides 2.6753*** 9.0396*** 0.8065***
 an opportunity to recycle (0.4798) (1.6309) (0.1553)
State requires a recycling plan 1.1786** 3.1273** 0.2653*
(0.4843) (1.5156) (0.1460)
State requires a recycling goal −0.0469 −0.6988 −0.0229
(1.0861) (3.3511) (0.3396)
Considers self environmentalist 1.2092*** 4.8764*** 0.4334***
(0.3358) (1.1723) (0.1189)
Income/10,000 0.0946** 0.3124** 0.0421***
(0.0379) (0.1378) (0.0144)
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. The R2 for the OLS equation is 0.2659. Regressions include a highest income 
category variable and a constant in the OLS and Tobit runs.
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.
 ** Significant at the 5 percent level.
  * Significant at the 10 percent level.
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recycling laws require mandatory recycling or 
an opportunity to recycle, followed by those 
requiring a recycling plan. These laws boost 
recycling rates with effects as high as 2.7 bottles 
out of 10 for the most stringent laws.
In terms of demographics, higher income levels 
boost recycling rates. Although the opportunity 
costs of recycling rise with income, which should 
decrease recycling rates, the observed positive 
influence of income indicates that there is a posi-
tive income elasticity of demand for the environ-
ment that offsets the role of income in raising the 
opportunity costs of recycling. The net result is 
that there is a slight increase in recycling at higher 
income levels. Income levels also have an inter-
active effect as they affect the relative attractive-
ness of different recycling modes. Viscusi et al. 
(forthcoming) find that bottle deposits are less 
influential in boosting recycling rates at higher 
income levels, and Bevin Ashenmiller (2009, 
2010) finds that bottle deposits are a significant 
income source for the poor.
Based on these results it is possible to calcu-
late the monetary equivalent of private  values 
and perceived social norms. Plastic water bottle 
deposits are 5 cents per bottle. Based on the 
effect of the variables relative to that of the 
plastic water bottle deposits variable, the warm 
glow benefit of recycling has an economic value 
of about 2.5 cents per bottle, and private values 
that reflect becoming upset at others’ failure to 
recycle have a value of about 4 cents per bottle.
To determine whether the norms variables 
themselves are affected by the laws and regu-
lations, Table 2 reports probit estimates of 
the determinants of whether the respondent 
would be upset if neighbors didn’t recycle, as 
well as whether the respondent believes neigh-
bors would be upset if people did not recycle. 
The first pair of regressions does not include 
regional characteristic variables. So, excluding 
these influences, residents of states with plas-
tic water bottle deposit laws do express greater 
concern with both the personal value for vir-
tue and the perceived external social norm for 
green guilt. There is also a positive effect on 
the internal social norms of the most stringent 
recycling law variable, which pertains to states 
Table 2—Probit Regressions Predicting Social Norms of Recycling
Respondent would 
be upset if neigh-
bors put recyclables 
in garbage
Respondent would 
be upset if neigh-
bors put recyclables 
in garbage
Neighbors would 
be upset if someone 
put recyclables in 
garbage
Neighbors would 
be upset if someone 
put recyclables in 
garbage
State has deposit law that does not 0.0637 −0.0083 −0.0062 −0.0571
 cover water bottles (0.0599) (0.0656) (0.0462) (0.0410)
State has deposit law covering 0.1213** 0.0724 0.1217*** 0.0693
 water bottles (0.0541) (0.0704) (0.0462) (0.0558)
State has mandatory recycling or 0.1503** 0.1139* 0.0624 0.0229
 provides an opportunity to recycle (0.0627) (0.0652) (0.0513) (0.0500)
State requires a recycling plan 0.0262 0.0303 0.0045 0.0201
(0.0577) (0.0594) (0.0470) (0.0477)
State requires a recycling goal −0.0611 −0.0729 0.0288 −0.0041
(0.1124) (0.1063) (0.1110) (0.0925)
Considers self environmentalist 0.3050*** 0.3088*** 0.0939*** 0.0972***
(0.0375) (0.0376) (0.0305) (0.0303)
Income/10,000 0.0152*** 0.0159*** 0.0069* 0.0068*
(0.0047) (0.0047) (0.0036) (0.0036)
Regional variables No Yes No Yes
Notes: Coefficients have been transformed to equal marginal effects. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Regressions 
include a high income category variable. The regional variables are for three census regions and whether the respondent lives 
in an SMSA.
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.
 ** Significant at the 5 percent level.
  * Significant at the 10 percent level.
MAY 201170 AEA PAPERS AND PROCEEDINGS
that have  mandatory recycling or provide the 
opportunity to recycle. That the most stringent 
bottle deposit variable and the most stringent 
recycling law variable influence social norms, 
but the less stringent ones do not, is consistent 
with the external perceptions of norms being 
influenced by policies that establish standards 
of behavior. However, the inclusion of a set of 
four broad regional variables in the final pair of 
regressions in Table 2 makes the policy effects 
insignificant, with the exception of the positive 
effect of mandatory recycling laws on personal 
norms. Thus, the influence of laws and deposit 
policies appears to be due largely to broad 
regional effects.
In contrast, the effect of private values 
remains strongly influential, even after includ-
ing the regional variables. People who consider 
themselves to be environmentalists have a 0.31 
higher probability of expressing a personal norm 
and a 0.10 higher probability of expressing an 
external social norm. Higher income levels, 
likewise, have a statistically significant positive 
effect in each instance, with the point estimate 
of the effect of income being more than twice 
as great for personal norms as compared to 
external social norms. In conjunction with the 
relatively greater effect of personal norms than 
external norms on recycling behavior shown in 
Table 1, the nonpecuniary determinants of the 
recycling decision are personal beliefs and atti-
tudes as well as personal norms, which in turn 
are influenced by private values.
Although private values and social norms 
matter, the policy levers that can be manipu-
lated—bottle deposits and recycling laws—
potentially have a powerful effect on recycling 
rates. Because of the discontinuous nature of the 
recycling decision, the results of these policies 
are often dramatic, as they transform individual 
households from nonrecyclers to diligent recy-
clers. However, individual attitudes with respect 
to both the environment and actions that others 
should take are influential as well. Perceptions 
of how others will perceive a household’s envi-
ronmental behaviors matter less.
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